Oil and intra-state conflict in Iraq and Syria: sub-state actors and challenges for Turkey’s energy security by Ipek P.
Oil and intra-state conflict in Iraq and Syria: sub-state actors
and challenges for Turkey’s energy security
Pinar Ipek
Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey
Major events since 2014 in the Middle East have brought Turkey’s growing energy import
dependency and resulting risks into an unease about its energy security. Especially after
Turkey’s downing of a Russian jetfighter at the Turkish border with Syria on 24 November
2015, policy makers began reconsidering Turkey’s diversification of gas supplies. Similarly,
Turkey’s increasing oil imports from Iraq raised questions about inter-state and intra-state
conflicts and their implications for energy security in the region since the fall of Mosul in
Iraq to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) on 10 June 2014. The continuing depen-
dency on fossil fuels of the Middle East not only in Turkey’s energy mix but also in world
energy demand requires further analysis of oil and conflict in the region, no matter how
inconvenient or ideologically and emotionally fraught it is. This article addresses the rela-
tionship between oil and conflict. Then, it examines the case of Turkey’s increasing energy
relations with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) to elucidate the implications of
inter-state and intra-state conflict on regional interdependence in the region. The argu-
ment asserts that risks of an abrupt regime change or revolutionary regime formation in
the aftermath of civil war in Syria and ethnic or sectarian violence in Iraq should be re-
evaluated. These risks, highly associated with intra-state conflicts, present challenges for
Turkey’s energy security and most importantly for human security in the region.
Ankara’s long-time aspiration of being an energy hub, underlying the country’s geo-
strategic location to diversify suppliers and transportation routes for Europe’s gas imports,
has been upheld since the inauguration ceremony for the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan oil pipeline
in July 2006.1 However, there were some limitations such as long-term gas contracts
signed with Russia and Iran and lack of infrastructure to transport required volumes of gas
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from other supplier countries. A series of energy deals between 2011 and 2014 aimed to
access oil and gas resources in Turkey’s energy-rich neighbours. The agreements with
(1) Azerbaijan for the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP) transporting Caspian
gas directly to European energy markets and replacing the larger and more expensive
Nabucco project,2 (2) Russia, where Turkey approved the South Stream gas pipeline’s tran-
sit through the Turkish exclusive economic zone in the Black Sea right after the TANAP
deal with Azerbaijan in December 2011,3 and then the memorandum of understanding
signed between Russia and Turkey in December 2014 to build the so-called ‘Turkish
Stream’, which would abolish the South Stream project and redirect the gas pipeline to
Turkey,4 and (3) the KRG, to build a new oil pipeline between northern Iraq and the Cey-
han terminal in March 2013,5 following talks with the Iraqi federal government to extend
the Kerkuk–Ceyhan pipeline to Basra in July 2012,6 were mostly prioritizing accessibility
and affordability of energy resources for supplying Turkey’s growing energy needs as well
as building an energy hub in Turkey. Nonetheless, the rapidly changing geopolitics of the
Middle East since ISIS’s formal declaration of a ‘new Islamic caliphate’ on 29 June 2014
and Russia’s military intervention in Syria on 30 September 2015 highlight challenges for
Turkey’s energy security.
This article is divided into three sections. The first section presents an overview of Tur-
key’s energy security in light of the International Energy Agency’s definition of energy
security and selected criteria to assess it. The second section outlines the major findings
important for oil related inter-state and intra-state conflict in the literature. The third sec-
tion focuses primarily on Kurdish sub-state actors in Iraq and Syria since they have an
increasing role in the intra-state conflicts of the region and are important for Turkey to
manage risks in its energy security. The article concludes with an overview of the argu-
ment and its policy implications.
Turkey’s energy security
The International Energy Agency defines energy security as ‘the uninterrupted availability
of energy sources at an affordable price’.7 In addition to accessibility and affordability of
energy resources, two other criteria, namely the reliability of energy suppliers and the sus-
tainability of energy resources are crucial. Turkey has been experiencing the fastest energy
demand growth among the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) countries and the second highest demand growth after China over the last
10 years. Turkey imports about 75 per cent of its primary energy supply, where oil and gas
account for 60 per cent in 2014, and the country’s oil and gas use is expected to double
over the next decade.
Despite the need for diversification of energy suppliers in Turkey and the country’s high
dependence on imported fossil resources, little changed in the last decade, and the same
group of countries preserved their large share of Turkey’s total oil and gas imports. In
2005, Turkey imported gas from Russia (66 per cent), Iran (16 per cent), and used liquefied
natural gas (LNG) (18 per cent). In subsequent years, Russia dominated Turkey’s gas
imports through the Blue Stream pipeline, although its share in the West pipeline and
LNG imports declined between 2005 and 2009. In 2014, Turkey’s largest gas suppliers
were still Russia (55 per cent) and Iran (18 per cent), and 86 per cent of total imports
were delivered via pipelines.8 Oil imports from Iraq have replaced a large share of Iranian
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oil imports since 2011. Iran’s share in Turkey’s oil imports declined to 30 per cent from
55 per cent in 2011, while Iraq’s share increased from 20 per cent in 2012 to 31 per cent
in 2014.9
On the other hand, the share of renewables in electricity production was targeted to be
30 per cent in 2023 but efforts to increase energy resource sustainability have been very
limited, given the current low share of renewables in energy supplies and consumption.
For example, in 2012, fossil (oil and gas) and solid (coal, lignite, and other solids) fuels had
the largest share in Turkey’s primary energy supply, with 59 per cent and 34 per cent,
respectively, while hydro (4 per cent) and renewables (3 per cent) had lower shares.10
Similarly, in 2014, the share of renewables (3 per cent, wind only) in electricity production
was insignificant, while natural gas (48 per cent), solids (30 per cent, including 14 per cent
coal imports), and hydro (16 per cent) had larger shares.11
In short, while more than 90 per cent of Turkey’s oil and gas supplies are imported, not
only does Turkey’s primary energy supply excessively depend on fossil and solid fuels but
also its electricity production has risks of disruption, given the high share of gas supplies
in electricity production and gas imports via pipelines. In 2014, Turkey imported 73 per
cent of its gas supplies from only two countries (Russia and Iran), and the same rate of oil
imports was predominantly from three Middle Eastern countries (Iraq, Iran and Saudi
Arabia). Turkey’s exit cost in its energy relations with these large suppliers is significantly
high in the short and medium term, especially for pipeline-bounded oil and gas imports.
Therefore, the asymmetric interdependence between Turkey and its energy suppliers
reflects a particular conception of energy security based on accessibility and affordability
at the expense of reliability and sustainability of energy resources.
Oil and conflict
The increasing turmoil in Syria and Iraq raises questions about the relationship between
oil and conflict. The mounting costs of conflicts have put enormous pressure on govern-
ment budgets and diverted resources away from much-needed social spending. More-
over, by January 2016 the lowest oil prices in twelve years signalled possible energy
security risks because lower oil prices affect economic and fiscal activity, as well as political
stability in the Middle East.12 Such prices also undermine oil production and investments
in other regions, since their costs are not competitive with the lowest cost of oil produc-
tion in the Middle East region.13
In a low price driven world oil market, understanding and explaining the impact of oil
wealth on conflict in the Middle East is important. The conventional argument about oil-
rich states being targets of international conflict is easily applied to Middle East geopolitics
since the American invasion of Iraq in 2003.14 However, petrostates with ‘revolutionary
governments’ or an anti-status quo foreign policy engage in militarized interstate disputes
at a much higher rate on average than other states.15 The concept of ‘revolutionary gov-
ernment’ in petrostates is a key to understanding domestic political dynamics and how oil
wealth supports resource-backed aggression. In fact, just being a petrostate, a state in
which the oil sector has a dominant role in the national economy with at least 10 per cent
of its gross domestic product (GDP), is not sufficient to explain the link between oil and
international conflict. Rather, a revolutionary government defined as ‘one that transforms
the existing social, political, and economic relationships of the state by overthrowing or
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rejecting the principal existing institutions of society’,16 and the oil income interact in a
way that explains why some petrostates are more likely to enhance conflict or launch a
militarized interstate dispute. Libya under Gaddafi’s rule, Iraq under Saddam’s rule, Sudan
and Iran till Khatami’s presidency can be listed as major examples for evidence. It is also
important to note that oil does not cause revolutionary government. While it can be
argued that the high oil prices contribute more to oil wealth, this does not cause the
emergence of revolutionary governments. But oil has an important role in secessionism
and intra-state conflict.17 The implications of oil wealth are important to explain and
understand intra-state conflict in Iraq and Syria.
Although each petrostate with a revolutionary government has its context-specific
political dynamics, in general these countries have more experience in civil wars than
non-petrostates.18 Furthermore, petrostates have long-lasting autocratic regimes. The
leaders in petrostates have greater policy autonomy than non-petrostate leaders, because
oil wealth creates a rentier economy with a spending effect, which allows redistribution of
oil income to buy political support.19 In addition, oil income supports petrostates’ military
expenditures and consequent capabilities. Oil under these circumstances can generate
conflict-enhancing behaviour and more adventurous aggressive foreign behaviour with
low risk of domestic punishment.20 On the other hand, lower oil prices can undermine the
spending effect, and therefore can lower the risk of inter-state conflicts. Nevertheless,
such prices affect economic and fiscal activity that facilitates redistribution of oil income
in favour of the authoritarian regimes in petrostates, which do not necessarily have revolu-
tionary governments. Hence, the implications of oil wealth during lower price oil markets
can be ironic in terms of increasing intra-state conflicts in the Middle East.
The literature on inter-state conflict (militarized interstate disputes) underlines the
effects of how a regime is formed and how it has changed. It should be noted that there
is no statistically significant relationship between regime type (democratic or autocratic)
and international conflict when we analyse at the state level.21 The arguments of demo-
cratic peace theory as democracies do not fight with each other can only be considered
at a dyadic level.22 In other words, having a democratic regime does not mean those
states do not engage in war. Rather, regime change and regime formation are more
important variables than regime type to explain reasons for inter-state conflict at state
level.23 States with evolutionary regime formation and gradual regime change are less
likely to engage in inter-state conflict than states with revolutionary regime formation and
abrupt regime change.24 These findings are important to elucidate further the conflict
enhancing behaviour of a petrostate with a revolutionary government past.
Accordingly, the social and political movements following the so-called Arab Spring,
which started in Tunisia in December 2010, unfold the problems of state-building and
regime formation in the history of the Middle East. When we consider the rapid changes
in the region since ISIS’s attack on Mosul in June 2014, a high degree of uncertainty in key
areas of regime-nature, intra-societal balances, and inter-state relationships throughout
the region moved an already volatile Middle East towards not only greater instability but
also towards a traumatic state of affairs for human security. The dangers of abrupt regime
change enforced by sub-state actors or a power struggle via proxy wars among non-pet-
rostates and conflict enhancing petrostates with a revolutionary government experience
in the past should be re-considered by all involved parties in the aftermath of civil war in
Syria, ethnic or sectarian violence in Iraq, and the war in Yemen.
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To sum up, the existence of oil does not necessarily trigger conflict, but the consequen-
ces of oil wealth associated with the potential of radical regime change and policy auton-
omy of leaders in conflict enhancing petrostates should be carefully examined to
understand challenges for energy security in the Middle East. The relationship between
oil and secessionism in explaining intra-state conflicts is important in understanding how
a power struggle over oil wealth can pose serious risks also for regional interdependence
between Turkey and its energy-rich neighbours.25 The following section focuses on Tur-
key’s increasing energy and trade relationship with Kurdish sub-state actors in Iraq and
deteriorating relations with other Kurdish sub-state actors in Syria.
Intra-state conflict and Kurds in Iraq and Syria
The neighbouring energy-rich countries of Turkey are important not only for its energy
security but also for its efforts to strengthen regional interdependence via booming trade
relations. Between 2004 and 2009, the most popular export destinations in terms of the
increase in the total number of Turkish firms exporting to one country were Iraq
(3326 firms), Azerbaijan (2687 firms), and Iran (2566 firms).26 Turkey is a major investor in
the Kurdish region of Iraq, with 1329 companies ranking number one in 2014 among all
foreign firms registered to do business there.27 Furthermore, about 300 local firms have
been established by Turkish citizens in the Kurdish region.28 Turkey’s exports to Iraq have
also been steadily increasing from $3.9 billion in 2008 to $11.9 billion in 2013.29 However,
the last two years accounted for a decline in exports ($8 billion in 2015)30 due to rising
instability and logistical difficulties after ISIS attacks to northern Iraq.
Relations between Turkey and Kurds in Iraq have historically been uneasy.31 Since the
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) launched armed attacks from Iraq against Turkish territories
in 1984,32 the key factor in Turkish foreign policy towards Iraq has been a deep suspicion
of the gradual transformation of Kurdish rule to an autonomous federal region and the
Kurdish people’s historical aspirations to an independent state, which was perceived to
bring negative repercussions for Turkey’s own ‘Kurdish problem’.33 While the US invasion
of Iraq in 2003 added to a decades-old belief among the Turkish public that the foreign
powers intend to create an independent Kurdistan that would partition Turkey, the Justice
and Development Party (JDP) government pursued a new activism in its foreign policy
known as ‘zero problems with neighbours’.34 Turkey’s then Minister of Foreign Affairs
Ahmet Davutoglu’s over-confident foreign policy was explicitly praised by senior foreign
policy figures asserting ‘Turkey as a new rising power center in the most important corri-
dor region of the world’.35 In light of such a transformation in Turkey’s approach to the
Middle East, then Foreign Minister Davutoglu visited the KRG and announced the opening
of a consulate in Erbil.36 In March 2011, Turkey’s then Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdo-
gan visited the KRG region, the first for such a high level visit.37 The JDP government’s
decision to increase cooperation with the KRG aimed to strengthen a regional interdepen-
dence in which energy security has been both a goal and an instrument by creating eco-
nomic incentives to lessen risks of Kurdish secessionist aspirations in Iraq and to solve
Turkey’s Kurdish problem.38
However, the power struggle over the ownership and distribution of oil revenues in
Iraq created a tension between Turkey and the federal government in Baghdad during
the period between KRG President Massoud Barzani’s visit to _Istanbul in April 2012 and
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Iraq Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s resignation in August 2014. The Turkish government
tried to move beyond the conflict between the KRG and the Iraqi federal government in
Baghdad about oil revenue-sharing mechanisms, management of oil fields, and disputed
territories. But in the absence of a federal hydrocarbon law, a set of ambiguities and omis-
sions in the related articles of Iraq’s constitution impeded significant progress in increas-
ing oil production and distributing oil wealth in all Iraqi governorates.
The most controversial issue in the constitution is about oil ownership under the fed-
eral structure of the Iraqi state. Although no federal unit can technically separate from
Iraq, Article 119 recognizes the right of one or more governorates to organize into a
region, and Article 117 specifically endorses the region of Kurdistan as a federal region.
These articles, along with Article 140, which asks for a census and a referendum in Kirkuk
and other disputed territories ‘to determine the will of their citizens’, create ambiguity in
defining regional borders and oil fields belonging to one or neighbouring regions.39 While
Article 111 states that ‘oil and gas are owned by all the people of Iraq in all the regions and
governorates’, Article 112.1 contradicts this, referring to the joint management of ‘present
fields’ by the federal government, oil-producing governorates and regional governments,
and implying that new exploration and production is to be fully controlled by regions and
provinces, excluding the federal government.40 There is more ambiguity in the constitu-
tion, regarding oil sector management. Articles 115 and 121.2 state that the regions and
producing governorates have the final say in the areas of shared (Article 114) and regional
(Article 121) jurisdiction. In light of these specific articles, the meaning of ‘present field’ in
Article 112.1 is the most contentious point. ‘Present field’ is not a standard term in the
petroleum industry, thus it can be interpreted in multiple ways,41 which creates disputes
regarding a revenue sharing formula. Article 112.1 clearly states that the federal govern-
ment, with the producing governorates and regional governments, distributes the reve-
nues from the present fields ‘in a fair manner in proportion to the population distribution
in all parts of the country’. Unless ‘present fields’ are defined as developed and undevel-
oped discovered Iraqi oil fields, revenue distribution would obviously favour the provinces
where the bulk of oil reserves is located.42 Thus, the bone of contention between the KRG
and the Iraqi federal government has been control over northern Iraq’s oil production and
revenues.
Nevertheless, Turkey increased its cooperation with the KRG government and tried to
downplay the tension between Erbil and Baghdad. Ankara talked with Baghdad about
extending the Kirkuk–Ceyhan pipeline to Basra in July 2012. In December 2012, the Turk-
ish-British venture Genel Energy trucked a small amount of oil extracted in the Kurdish
region to Turkey’s Ceyhan terminal. However, the Iraqi oil ministry responded swiftly to
Kurdish oil exports bypassing Iraq and suspended payments for the 17 per cent of its fed-
eral budget allocated to the KRG for its share of national oil production.43 Not only Iraq
but also the United States opposed oil exports from any part of Iraq without the approval
of the federal Iraqi government.44 But in March 2013, a framework agreement was
reached between Turkey and the KRG, which includes investing in some exploration
blocks and facilitating oil and gas exports in the Kurdish region.45 In May 2013, then Prime
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced a deal between Exxon Mobil and a Turkish
state-run oil firm to develop projects in the Kurdish region. Although Iraq’s deputy prime
minister of energy declared that ‘the deal is illegal and is not in line with the Iraqi constitu-
tion,’ Erdogan emphasized the importance of energy cooperation with the KRG.46 When
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the construction of an independent pipeline to carry oil from the Kurdish region to Cey-
han terminal in Turkey was completed at the end of 2013,47 the Turkish-state-owned pipe-
line company, BOTAŞ also started building a new gas pipeline route towards the northern
Iraq border to import gas from this region.48
Although the Turkish government’s decision to allow operation of new independent
pipelines from the KRG region to Turkey seeks a balance between Erbil’s fears of exploita-
tion by the federal government and eliminating Kurdish secessionist aspirations, Baghdad
asserts its rights over both old and new oil fields (‘present fields’ in the constitution). The
KRG’s claims to sign contracts for any new fields in its territory49 and closer relations with
Turkey to access international markets underline the relationship between oil wealth and
intra-state conflict in Iraq. In October 2013, Turkey emphasized its respect for Iraq’s consti-
tution and stated that ‘it will not permit any kind of oil shipments without the approval of
the federal government in Baghdad’.50 In the aftermath of ISIS’s initial attacks on northern
Iraq in June 2014, the required defence cooperation between the KRG’s Peshmerga armed
forces and the Iraqi army forced the new government of Haider al-Abadi to sign a tempo-
rary agreement with the KRG to settle the oil dispute.51 However, Peshmerga forces had
taken control of Kirkuk and its giant oil field, as well as other major fields in the north of
ISIS-controlled areas. As of January 2016, the KRG controlled areas were enlarged by about
40 per cent.52
The confrontation with ISIS has also revealed the fierce competition among Kurdish
political groups. The Democratic Union Party (PYD) in Syria has been in rivalry with the
Kurdistan Democrat Party (KDP) over the Syrian Kurds.53 In fact, a media war after the
siege of Kobane (known also as Ayn al-Arab) by ISIS in September 2014 demonstrated
entrenched divisions among sub-state Kurdish actors. Although the PYD and its armed
forces of the People’s Protection Units (YPG) in Syria are strongly interlinked with the PKK
and its militia People’s Defense Force (HPG) is training the YPG, their leaders and the pro-
PKK Kurdish Freedom Movement (KCK) leaders exchanged accusing statements.54
Because the quick advancement of ISIS next to KRG controlled areas in Iraq raised ques-
tions about the actual military capability of Kurdish armed groups in Iraq. However, the
PYD of Syria and its armed forces, the YPG, were able to take control of the Kurdish-major-
ity areas (now called Rojova, ‘the West’) in northern Syria. The political rivalry among Kurd-
ish parties was evident when Barzani stated ‘PKK, PYD are the same’ in March 2016
following an official condemnation of the PKK officials’ threat to disrupt the export of nat-
ural gas from the KRG region through Turkey.55
Meanwhile, Turkish foreign policy has been like a roller coaster ride since the raging
civil war in Syria in 2012, when the fighting between opposition groups and the govern-
ment forces reached the capital Damascus and Aleppo.56 The turning point for the JDP
government’s threat perception against ISIS and other sub-state actors in the region was
advancement of YPG forces in Syria and their capture of Tal Abyad, a strategic northern
border town, from ISIS on 16 June 2015. On 20 July 2015 a Turkish suicide bomber
recruited by ISIS killed dozens of youth peace activists gathered in Suruç to deliver aid for
children in Kobane, which is a couple of hours away from the Turkish border town.57 On
the other hand, the results of the June 2015 general elections, which recorded the highest
support for the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) in Turkish political history,
had raised hopes for a conflict resolution process of Turkey’s Kurdish problem.58 However,
the incidents following the Suruc bombing and the JDP-led interim government’s shift to
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military measures against the PKK ended the ceasefire. The clashes escalated between
Turkish security forces and the PKK has been devastating for Kurdish people living in the
insurgency zones. While political parties failed to form a coalition government, the intensi-
fied attacks by the PKK against security forces and another ISIS suicide bombing in Ankara
on 10 October 2015, which was the deadliest terrorist attack in Turkey, spread fear among
the public.
Following the rising insecurity surrounding ISIS attacks in urban areas and the military
measures against the PKK, Ankara’s insistence on a military defeat of the Bashar al-Assad
regime as a condition of joining the US-led operations against ISIS was halted.59 In a state-
ment issued on 24 July 2015 Turkey announced that it would allow US forces to operate
against ISIS out of Incirlik Air Base as well as from bases in Diyarbakir and Malatya.60
Although Turkey’s alleged involvement with ISIS was interpreted as Turkey’s disappoint-
ment with the US’s vigilant policy to remove the Assad regime in full force and as Turkey’s
containment policy against Kurdish groups’ advancement in Syria,61 the government’s
relations with the post-state entity ISIS and Kurdish sub-state actors in Syria and Iraq
developed into a new phase.
The US support for and cooperation with the YPG, the military unit of the PYD raised
questions in Ankara. Turkey considers the PYD to be an offshoot of the PKK despite
Ankara’s initial approach to engage the PYD into opposition for the removal of the Bashar
al-Assad regime in Syria. In fact, in July 2013 then Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu
explicitly stated Turkey’s three basic expectations from PYD: (1) not to cooperate with the
Assad regime, (2) not to form a de facto political status in Syria, and (3) not to endanger
the security of Turkey’s border.62 The so-called ‘Kurdish corridor’63 was perceived as
Turkey’s recurring nightmare about an independent Kurdish state and a threat to its mili-
tary measures against the PKK.64 The US government also designates the PKK a terrorist
organization but says it regards the YPG as a separate group. The American effort to
rebrand the YPG as a coalition with Arab rebels called the Syrian Democratic Forces has
brought only a small number of Arabs into the force so far. Thus, the political tension
among opposition groups in Syria as well as between Turkey and the United States over
the involvement of PYD forces in war against ISIS has continued since 2013.65
In short, within the complicated and ever-changing power landscape in Syria and ISIS
controlled areas of Iraq, the post-state entity of ISIS and Kurdish sub-state actors have
gained ground that represents clear risks of abrupt regime changes within the existing
states of Iraq and Syria or revolutionary regime formation if partition of Syria occurs.
Conclusion
The JDP government’s efforts to create regional interdependence with its neighbouring
energy-rich states were severely undermined through rising violence in Iraq and Syria’s
collapse into a failed state. Furthermore, the structural problem for democratization in pet-
rostates limits the benefits of regional interdependence particularly for ordinary people.66
The structure of the rentier economy in petrostates combined with the repression effect is
well known to be the major problem in intra-state conflicts of the region. The dependence
of prominent state bureaucrats, military officials, regional administrators, and business-
men on the allocation of oil wealth, strictly controlled by the political leadership and its
extended network of family/tribe members, further strengthens the policy autonomy of
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leaders in the petrostates of the Middle East. Similarly, the ruling political leaders in Iraq,
including in the Kurdish region, have been closely associated with networks of major tribe
members along sectarian lines.67 These groups are supportive of the ruling political lead-
ership to the extent that oil revenues and resources in nepotistic sectors are distributed
selectively in exchange for political acquiescence.68 In fact, previous Prime Minister Nouri
al-Maliki’s authoritarian rule and nepotism has reignited ethnic and sectarian violence in
Iraq, where May 2013 saw the most violent politically related attacks since 2006 and 2007,
and before the expansion of ISIS into Iraq.69
Therefore, it is important to note that the on-going strife in the region is mostly driven
by agencies of intra-state conflict, which is embedded in the structural problems of
democratization and the struggle over distribution of wealth among social forces.70 In
other words, solely focusing on oil and interstate conflict or a proxy war, which can
change the geopolitical map of Syria and Iraq would be misleading. In light of the argu-
ments that underline the risks of abrupt regime change in existing states or ‘revolutionary
regime formation’,71 intra-state conflicts are a potential for combustion in the region in
the aftermath of bloodshed among various ethnic and sectarian groups.
Accordingly, the role of Kurdish sub-state groups should be reconsidered by all actors
involved in Syria and Iraq. While Turkey, Russia and the United States officially endorse
the territorial integrity of Iraq, their geostrategic differences regarding the Syrian conflict
pose serious contradictions for energy security in the region. The YPG, fighting together
with some Free Syrian Army-aligned rebels, and backed by US-led coalition air strikes
against ISIS, have taken control of some territories in Syria with its ethnically mixed popu-
lation.72 While Washington shied away from engaging diplomatically with the PYD, the
Syrian civil war has been sowing feelings of mutual distrust and revenge for so long that
an exclusive military focus to defeat ISIS is insufficient. Moreover, Russia’s presence in Syria
now creates stronger threat perceptions among various groups in their competition to
capture new territories while rolling back ISIS. In fact, the tension between the Erbil and
Baghdad governments over ownership and control of oil revenues adds to the
entrenched divisions within Kurdish groups who use the Russian military presence in Syria
as leverage in their bargaining with the United States.73
No matter how ideologically and emotionally fraught it is, Kurdish secessionism
and/or the strategic benefits of a ‘Kurdish corridor’ could not eliminate structural and
agency driven problems of intra-state conflict underlined in this article. Consequently,
Turkey and other involved parties in the region should focus on a political map that
compares short-term benefits of a proxy war or stability enforced by sub-state actors’
authoritarian control over oil revenues and secure pipeline routes with the long-term
benefits of empowering distributive mechanisms of oil wealth for human develop-
ment within the territorial integrity of Iraq and Syria. In other words, a narrow
agenda prioritizing accessibility and affordability of energy resources is insufficient to
enhance energy security since the reliability of energy suppliers matters and cannot
be maintained in the paradox of energy trade and oil wealth impeding peaceful and
democratic change in the region.
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27. ‘Foreign companies resume regular activity in Kurdistan’ KRG News, 1 October 2014. Accessed
22 May 2016. http://www.krg.org/a/d.aspx?sD040000&lD12&aD52312.
28. ‘1500 T€urk yatırımcı Irak'ın kuzeyinde’ (1500 Turkish investors in northern Iraq) Sabah, 26 Janu-
ary 2014.
29. $5.1 billion in 2009, $6 billion in 2010, 8.3 billion in 2011, $10.8 billion in 2012 and $10.8 billion
in 2014. Turkish Statistical Agency, Foreign Trade Statistics. Accessed 22 May 2016. http://www.
tuik.gov.tr/PreTablo.do?alt_idD1046.
30. Excluding the exports in December 2015.
31. For a historical review of Kurdish nationalism in Turkey, see N.G. Loizides, ‘State Ideology and
the Kurds in Turkey’, Middle Eastern Studies Vol.46, No.4 (2010), pp.513–27; M.H. Yavuz, ‘Five
stages of the construction of Kurdish nationalism in Turkey’, Nationalism & Ethnic Politics Vol.7,
No.3 (2001), pp.1–24; and W. Jwaideh, Kurdish National Movement: Its Origins and Development
(New York: Syracuse University Press, 2006).
32. For an historical overview of the PKK’s emergence and its challenge to the state, see N.A. €Ozcan,
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33. Kemal Kirişçi, ‘The Kurdish Question and Turkish Foreign Policy’ in The Future of Turkish Foreign
Policy edited by L.G. Martin and D. Keridis (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004), pp.277–320.
34. For an analysis of Turkish foreign policy under Ahmet Davutoglu, see Z. Arkan and M.
Kınacıoglu, ‘Enabling “ambitious activism”: Davutoglu’s vision of a new foreign policy identity
for Turkey’, Turkish Studies (published online 30 May 2016); and N. Karacasulu, ‘Interpreting Tur-
key’s Middle East Policy in the Last Decade’, All Azimuth Vol.4, No.1 (2015), pp.27–38.
35. I. Kalın, ‘US-Turkish Relations under Obama: Promise, Challenge and Opportunity in the 21st
Century’, Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies Vol.12, No.1 (2010), pp.93–108.
36. A. Shadid, ‘Resurgent Turkey Builds Influence Across Iraq’, The New York Times, 5 January 2011.
37. ‘Turkey’s Erdogan in first visit to Iraq Kurd region’, Reuters. Accessed 22 May 2016. http://www.
reuters.com/article/iraq-turkey-kurds-idUSLDE72S2CD20110329.
38. For the role of energy security in Turkish foreign policy, see P. _Ipek, ‘The Role of Energy Security
in Turkish Foreign Policy (2004-2016)’ in Turkish Foreign Policy: International Relations, Legality
416 P. IPEK
and Global Reach edited by P. G€ozen (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, forthcoming in March
2017).
39. Among Iraq’s 18 provinces, Kirkuk has the second largest oil production and the second largest
proven oil reserves, after Basra.
40. The Iraqi constitution, Accessed 22 May 2016. http://www.iraqinationality.gov.iq/attach/iraqi_
constitution.pdf.
41. One definition could be oil fields currently producing oil and gas. Another could refer to all dis-
covered structures of oil in Iraq, producing or not. If all undeveloped fields are considered ‘pres-
ent fields’, then there is no confusion; if they are not, some of the giant fields that have been
partially developed would create conflict.
42. Anbar, Duhok, Babail, and Diwaniya provinces have no developed or discovered oil and gas
fields. The ethnic and sectarian distribution of the population in oil- and gas-rich provinces
favours relatively Shi’ite and Kurdish people, except for Kirkuk, which is a multi-ethnic province.
43. J. Payne and P. Mackey, ‘Update 2-Iraqi Kurdistan Starts Independent Crude Oil Exports’, Reuters,
8 May 2013. Accessed 22 May 2016. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/08/kurdistan-
crude-exports-idUSL5E9C843R20130108.
44. US Department of State, Daily Press Briefing, 11 December 2012. Accessed 18 May 2016. http://
www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2012/12/201811.htm.
45. ‘Turkey’s Botas to build new pipeline for Kurdish gas’, Platts Oilgram News, 8 October 2013.
46. E. Peker, ‘Turkey-Kurds Deal on Oil Riles Iraq’,Wall Street Journal, 15 May 2013.
47. The pipeline with a capacity of 150,000 barrels per day (b/d) that can be extended to
200,000 b/d, linked the Genel Energy-operated Taq field with the Khurmala field, and Dohuk is
linked into a 300,000 b/d pipeline to the Baghdad-controlled Fishkabour metering station. A
new tie-in-station is constructed at Fishkabour, which can link the pipeline into Kirkuk–Ceyhan
just before the Turkish border, but political and legal processes have stalled its operation. D.
O’Byrne and S. Elliott, ‘Turkey open to talks on Kurdish oil pipeline’, Platts Oilgram News, 29
August 2013.
48. The gas pipeline will transport a minimum of 10 bcm/year to Turkey, while the oil pipeline has a
planned capacity of minimum 1 million b/d. The amount of gas to be carried by 2025 may com-
prise 30% of Turkey’s gas consumption. E. Peker, ‘Kurds, Turkey edge toward oil deal’,Wall Street
Journal, 31 October 2013; and C. Camlıbel, ‘2014 a turning point for Kurdish oil and gas’, H€urriyet
Daily News, 24 November 2014.
49. In 2007, the Kurdish parliament passed its own petroleum law. Exxon-Mobil and Chevron (US),
Total (France), Gazprom (Russia), DNO (Norway), and Addax Petroleum (China) have agreements
with the KRG.
50. ‘Turkey aware of Iraqi concerns on KRG oil’, H€urriyet Daily News, 1 November 2013.
51. ‘Turkey, Iraq refresh vows to mend ties’, H€urriyet Daily News, 20 November 2014.
52. ‘Kurds realize dream as Baghdad loses grip on north Iraq’, Reuters, 14 June 2014. Accessed 22
May 2016. http://www.reuters.com/article/iraq-security-kurds-idUSL5N0OT36U20140613.
53. For an analysis of the divergence between PYD and Iraqi Kurds, see T.F. Paasche, ‘Syrian and
Iraqi Kurds: Conflict and Cooperation’, Middle East Policy Vol.22, No.1 (2015), pp.77–88.
54. For details, see O. Ali, ‘The Implications of the War on ISIS in Kurdistan’, ORSAM Review of
Regional Affairs 10, (Ankara: ORSAM, September 2014), pp.5–7.
55. ‘PKK, PYD are the same, Barzani says’, H€urriyet Daily News, 23 March 2016 and ‘Kurdistan
Regional Government condemns PKK officials statements’, Kurdistan Regional Government
News, 18 February 2016. Accessed 22 May 2016. http://cabinet.gov.krd/a/d.aspx?sD040000&lD
12&aD54250.
56. Pro-democracy protests erupted in March 2011 in the southern city of Deraa. After security
forces opened fire on demonstrators, the unrest triggered nationwide protests. By July 2011,
hundreds of thousands demanding President Bashar al-Assad’s resignation were taking to the
streets across the country. Violence escalated as rebel brigades were formed to battle against
government forces; and the country descended into civil war in 2012.
57. C. Yengisu, ‘Suicide Bomber Is Identified as a Turk Suspected of ISIS Ties’, The New York Times, 23
July 2015.
MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES 417
58. The JDP government lost its 13 years of majority rule due to electoral gains of the HDP (13% of
the total votes) in the June 2015 election. For the inconsistencies in the JDP’s policy about the
Kurdish question and the reasons, see M.H. Yavuz and N.A. €Ozcan, ‘The Kurdish question and
Turkey’s Justice and Development Party’, Middle East Policy Vol.13, No.1, (2006), pp.103, 107–11.
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